stock market, and that these conversations can a¤ect individual behavior. For example, investors pick among a dizzying number of individual stocks when evaluating which to buy, and may obtain information from discussions with their colleagues, or make inferences based on observing their decisions. Or, conversations with colleagues can simply raise awareness of or trust in equity markets and make trading more likely Japelli, 2003, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2010) . Du ‡o and Saez (2003) document strong evidence of workplace interaction in a related context. They use a randomized trial to document that social interaction in ‡uences the decision to enroll in a tax deferred account scheme. 4 In order to examine the e¤ects of co-workers on stock market behavior, we use a unique matched employer-employee panel data set from Norway. The dataset has annual observations on the entire labor market, which allows us to track individuals as they move between plants over time. Because we are able to match individuals to plants, we also know who each individual's colleagues are in every year. 5 We combine the matched employeremployee dataset with yearly socio-demographic information at individual level, including information about family relationships and residential zip code. This data is merged with a complete record of common stock transactions made by Norwegian individual investors in the period [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . To avoid capturing e¤ects via employee stock programs, we exclude plants that are belong to publicly listed companies.
We study whether an individual makes a purchase in a given month, and link it to the fraction of their co-workers that make a purchase, controlling for individual sociodemographic characteristics. The e¤ects are large: a ten percentage point increase in the fraction of co-workers that make a purchase in a given month is associated with an increase of two percentage points in the individual's propensity to make a purchase. An advantage of our data is that we can examine peer e¤ects also at a much more detailed level; in the selection of individual stocks. We …nd that a ten percentage point increase in the fraction of co-workers that purchase a particular stock is associated with an increase of 1:7 percentage points in the individual's own purchase of that stock. This result, which 4 In a di¤erent context Gompers et al. (2005, p. 612) argue that when working with colleagues who have been involved in startups, "employees learn from their coworkers about what it takes to start a new …rm." One can easily see envisage similar mechanisms for stock market activity. 5 There are 50 people employed in the median …rm in our dataset.
3 continues to hold after including stock …xed e¤ects, is quite striking given that there are hundreds of stocks listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange.
Stock market activity could be correlated at the plant level due to other reasons than conversations between colleagues. We apply panel data techniques in order to address concerns about common unobservables. Plant and zip code …xed e¤ects account for timeinvariant systematic di¤erences. Including yearly socio-demographic variables as controls make it unlikely that our results are driven by individual …xed e¤ects. Monthly (stocklevel) …xed e¤ects remove the in ‡uence of market-wide news releases, and of extrapolation from past returns. Industry-month …xed e¤ects remove the in ‡uence of trade journals and other industry-speci…c events. Plant peer e¤ects are both economically and statistically strong after taking into account …xed e¤ects.
A possibility nevertheless remains that the workers of a particular plant experience common shocks (such as bonus payments) that are unobservable. In order to address this issue, we study individuals that change place of work. We consider how the relation between the trading decision of co-workers and the individual evolves over time. Figure 1 illustrates how the e¤ect of old (new) co-workers decreases (increases) signi…cantly when the individual leaves (joins) the new plant (see section 3.1 for details). We …nd that old peers a¤ect individual choices after the investors has moved from the plant albeit at a lower rate, which is suggestive of word-of-mouth e¤ects.
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A natural question is whether our results are driven by neighborhood e¤ects. This could be the case, for example, if co-workers tend to live in the same area. Because we have matched socio-demographic information for the entire population of Norway we can identify both neighbors and family members, and control for peer e¤ects along these dimensions. Our analysis suggests that the impact of zip code peers is signi…cantly reduced when workplace and family peers are introduced. In contrast, the impact of workplace peers is much less a¤ected by the introduction of the other peer groups and socioeconomic control variables. To assess workplace peer e¤ects further, we can compare their magnitude to the magnitude of family and zip code peer e¤ects. Our results suggest that workplace peer e¤ects are comparable in magnitude to the peer e¤ects inside the family, and are quite large compared to peer e¤ects at the zip code level. For example, increasing the fraction of co-workers that make a stock purchase by one standard deviation (6:32 percentage points) increases the probability of making a purchase by 1:08 percentage points. In contrast, increasing the fraction of geographical peers that make a purchase by one standard deviation (1:63 percentage points) increases the predicted probability of making a purchase by 0:44 percentage points.
Further, we consider whether peer purchases yield abnormal returns. We …nd that co-worker peer purchases are neither associated with positive abnormal performance or negative abnormal performance. However, since we have abstracted from transaction costs, peer e¤ects could be detrimental in so far that it might result in excessive amounts of trading. This suggest that investors respond to communication from peers even though this communication does not appear to contain valuable information.
To sum up, we analyze a new channel for social interaction between stock market investors: the workplace, and …nd strong evidence of peer e¤ects both in the timing of purchases and in stock selection. The e¤ects are robust to including …xed e¤ects that control for unobserved heterogeneity at the plant, geographical and stock level.
Our paper connects to the literature in several ways. Most importantly, while the literature on institutional investors in the stock market …nds strong evidence of social interaction and network e¤ects (Hong et al., 2005 , Cohen et al., 2007 , Cohen et al., 2010 , the evidence on social interaction among individual investors in the stock market (Feng and Seasholes, 2004, Ivkovic and Weissbenner, 2007) has been more mixed. We consider a novel channel for peer e¤ects; the workplace, and contribute to the literature by showing that co-worker investment decisions can explain a substantial amount of heterogeneity in individual stock market behavior.
The previous literature has considered peer e¤ects along one dimension. A methodological innovation of the paper is to accommodate three types of peer e¤ects: at work, in the family, and in the neighborhood. This allows us to control for alternative peer e¤ects in the analysis of workplace peer e¤ects. It also allows us to perform a "horse race" between di¤erent kinds of peer e¤ects. We …nd that neighborhood e¤ects can be important, consistent with Ivkovic and Weissbenner (2007) , but obtain more unequivocal a¢ rmative results for the e¤ects of social interaction in the workplace and, less surprisingly, in the family. As discussed in Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2002) , it is often important for policy purposes to separate individual and social multiplier e¤ects, the reason being that the aggregate impact of intervention may be larger than the sum of its e¤ects on each individual's decision. Consistent with the …ndings of Du ‡o and Saez (2003) in the context of retirement plans, our results suggest that the social multiplier in the workplace is large both in absolute and relative terms when it comes to stock market behavior.
The paper also connects to a large empirical literature that documents poor asset allocation in settings related to the workplace. For example, Benartzi (2001) …nds that employees often invest voluntarily in company stock, in spite of the poor hedging prop-6 erties of such investments. Although excessive extrapolation, as suggested by Benartzi (2001) can explain why individuals invest in stocks with a strong prior performance, this argument cannot fully explain why they invest in company stock -there are many stocks with a strong prior performance. Our …ndings suggests the possibility that voluntary investments in company stock may be partially driven by peer e¤ects at the …rm level:
one obvious object of workplace conversations is the stock market performance of the employer's stock. Cohen (2008) documents that employees of stand-alone …rms invest 10 percentage points more in company stock than conglomerate employees. While excessive extrapolation cannot explain this pattern, Cohen (2008) argues that it is consistent with greater loyalty among employees of stand-alone …rms. The results of the present paper suggests a complementary explanation: that social interaction e¤ects, a¤ecting beliefs, could be stronger at stand-alone …rms than at conglomerates.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data.
Section 3 presents the main results on the purchase decision and Section 4 the main results on stock selection and in Section 5 we consider the performance of peer purchases.
Section 6 concludes.
Data
The data are proprietary and have been collected from three sources. 
Peer Groups
Our reference group is the about 460; 000 individuals that make at least one purchase of a common stock at the Oslo Stock Exchange between 1994 and 2005 (about 10% of the population of Norway). This is the relevant group when we de…ne the peer variables.
For each year, we construct the sample of individuals in the following way. (1) 
Trade
In this section we relate the decision to trade of peers to the trading decision of the investor. Since very few individual investors short stocks, considering sell transactions implies conditioning on the investor already owning stocks. Therefore, we consider only trades that are purchases.
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We create a dummy variable buy i;t that takes the value 1 if investor i has bought a stock in month t and 0 otherwise. For our three peer groups we calculate the fraction of peers that trade in that particular month. We denote these fractions buy Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our dependent and main independent variables for the trade analysis. In any given month 2:12% of all individuals buy a stock. The mean fraction of plant, family and zip code peers that make a purchase is 1:97%, 0:93% and 1:83% respectively.
We examine the e¤ect of peers on the decision to trade by estimating the following linear regression,
where dependent and independent variables are de…ned as above. In the above speci…ca-tion, is a column vector of socio-demographic control variables and b is a row vector of coe¢ cients. Our socio-demographic variables include (and various powers of, see the caption to Table 2 for speci…cs): age, wealth, labour income, sex and the number of years of education. 11 We include month dummies to control for economy-wide trends in trading behavior. It is possible that the similarity in trading behavior among co-workers is driven by other plant speci…c factors. To control for this we introduce plant …xed e¤ects.
Similarly, we introduce zip code and postcode-plant interaction …xed e¤ects. It is reasonable to expect that some part of the trading decision is driven by the industry that the individual is employed in, perhaps through industry periodicals. To this end we introduce industry …xed e¤ects based on the …rst two digits of the NACE code of the industry of employment of the individual. We cluster our standard errors at the individual level to control for serial correlation in errors.
12 Table 2 presents our regression results. Speci…cations (1) to (3) considers the relation between one of our peer groups and the trading decision of the individual while speci…-cations (4) to (6) considers pair-wise combinations of the peer groups and (7) includes all three peer groups. All three peer groups are signi…cant at the 1% level in all speci…cations. In terms of economic magnitude, in speci…cation (7) a one standard deviation increase in co-worker trading activity (buy
) results in an increase in trading activity of 50:98% relative to the unconditional mean. The impact of family and neighbors is lower, a one standard deviation increase is associated with an increase in trading activity of 27:71% and 20:52% respectively. Thus, co-workers have the largest impact on the trading decision. Additionally, the introduction of co-workers reduces the impact of neighbors by roughly 19% (comparing speci…cations (3) and (5)).
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A potential concern is that our results are driven by a particular industry. For example, it could be the case that the co-worker peer e¤ect is particularly strong in the energy sector. To mitigate these concerns we (i) include industry …xed e¤ects in all of our speci…cations in Table 2 and (ii) in Appendix 3 we estimate a separate co-worker peer e¤ect for each of 36 industries that represent a signi…cant proportion of our sample. The results overwhelmingly support the notion that co-worker peer e¤ects are universal across 11 Appendix 2 contains descriptive statistics of our sociodemographic control variables. 12 In unreported results we have also clustered standard errors around month. The resulting t-statistics are lower, but still highly signi…cant. 13 We have also considered more parsimonious speci…cations without our …xed e¤ects. In this case, the impact of all of our peer groups is signi…cantly stronger. We also …nd that the introduction of sociodemographic control variables reduces the impact of neighborhood peers disproportionately, suggesting that the zip code proxies for co-worker interaction and other omitted variables.
industries. Additionally, we decompose our investor observations (for the entire sample) according to industry. No single industry accounts for more than 11:37% of our investor observations. 14 It could also be the case that the similarity in trading that we observe is to some extent driven by common responses to media. In Norway there are 429 municipalites (kommuner) and even local media serves multiple municipalities and therefore introducing municipality month …xed e¤ects controls for common media shocks. In unreported analysis we …nd that the introduction of these …xed e¤ects does not qualitatively change the co-worker peer e¤ect. 
New and Former Co-workers
In this section we consider the evolution of peer e¤ects when the investor changes place of work. Our data contains the end date of employment at the old plant and the start date of employment at the new plant (see Huttunen, Møen and Salvanes, 2009 , for a complete description of the data). This allows us to examine whether peer e¤ects of old (new) peers is decreasing (increasing) over time following a move.
For an investor move to be included in our analysis we require that the termination and start date are both non-missing. At the time of the move, we require that the investor did not change place of employment in the preceding year or does not change place of employment in the next year. Additionally, we require that the investor moves at most four times between 1993 and 2005. Finally, we require that the start date at the new place of work is later than the stop date at the previous plant. Applying, the above criteria leaves us with roughly 45; 000 investor moves. Of these moves, roughly 40% are investors that just move once, another 40% move twice and the remaining investors move three times (almost no individuals move four times).
To test the relative impact of new and former co-workers we interact our explanatory variables, the fraction of old (buy old ) and new (buy new ) co-workers that make a purchase, with dummy variables that takes the value 1 if the date is before / after the stop / start at the old / new plant and 0 otherwise. For example, the variable buy old bef ore t is the fraction of old co-workers that make a purchase prior to the investor leaving the plant and after the termination date the variable takes a value of 0. Our basic regression estimates Table 2 . We include month, plant and zip code …xed e¤ects. We also include postcode-plant interaction …xed e¤ects.
Our results are presented in Table 3 . In speci…cation (1) we consider the change in the peer e¤ect of old co-workers when the individual leaves the plant. For each individual, we restrict the sample to 12 months before the individual leaves the plant to 12 months after leaving. The purchases of former co-workers is positively related to the purchases before and after the move. However, as expected the e¤ect of former co-workers is greater before the move than after the move (the point estimate drops from 0:270 to 0:159). The F test statistic for a di¤erence between 1 and 2 is 16:71 and signi…cant at the 1% level.
In speci…cation (2) we consider the change in peer e¤ect of new co-workers when the individual joins the new plant. We restrict the sample to 12 months before the individual joins the new plant to 12 months after the start date. 16 We …nd that the purchasing decision of new co-workers is positively related to the individual's trading decision. As expected, the impact of new co-workers increases substantially (the point estimate increases from 0:116 to 0:332) when the individual joins the new plant. The F statistic for a di¤erence between 3 and 4 is 97:55 and statistically signi…cant at the 1% level.
Finally, in speci…cation (3) we simultaneously include the e¤ect of old and new coworkers before and after the individual leaves (joins) the old (new) plant. For each investor, we restrict the sample to 12 months before the investor joins the new plant and to 12 months after the investor leaves the old plant.
The results in this speci…cation mirrors those in the two previous speci…cations.
Firstly, the e¤ect of co-workers at the old plant is substantial, but signi…cantly reduced following the move. Secondly, the e¤ect of new co-workers is substantially increased once the individual has joined the new plant. Additionally, this speci…cation allows us to compare the impact of individuals that previously have been co-workers to the e¤ect of those individuals that will become co-workers. It is possible that our results could be driven by common liquidity shocks induced by severance packages. To control for this possibility we include dummies for the number of months before leaving from the old plant (in speci…cations 1 and 3), and dummies for the number of months prior to joining the new plant (speci…cations 2 and 3). Thus, these …xed e¤ects will capture any extra buying intensity in the month after leaving the old plant due to the individual investing his severance package (or buying less due to job uncertainty).
Next, we examine the evolution of the e¤ect of peers surrounding the move. To do this we introduce one dummy variable for each of 12 months before to 12 months after the investors leaves (joins) the old (new) plant. We interact our dummy variables with buy plant old t to examine how the in ‡uence of peers evolve surrounding the move. We 17 Interestingly, we …nd that future co-workers (buy new bef ore t ) a¤ect the decision to make a purchase of the investor. This is likely driven by the investor interacting with his future colleagues and perhaps even acquiring his future job through these interactions. 18 In unreported analysis, we follow Nanda and Sørensen (2010) and consider the impact of placebo peers on the decision to purchase stock. A placebo peer is someone that during the previous year moved away from the plant to which the investor moved to in this year. That is, the investor and the peer have both been exposed to plant speci…c e¤ects, but they have never overlapped at the same plant. As expected, we …nd no relation between the purchases of placebo peers and the purchase decision of investors.
13 estimate the following regression
The vector contains family and zip peer control variables with coe¢ cients. Additionally, we include plant …xed e¤ects and time dummies. We run one separate regression for the old plant and the new plant.
In Figure 1 we have plotted the interacted peer coe¢ cient against the number of months before the move. For the new plant, there is a striking increase in the e¤ect of new co-workers following the move. Additionally, the e¤ect of co-workers at the old plant drops signi…cantly after the move. 
Local and Expertise Trades
There is substantial evidence in the literature that investors show a preference for local stocks (for example Coval and Moskowitz, 1999 and Huberman, 2001 ). Additionally, Døskeland and Hvide (2011) document that investors show a preference for investing in stocks in industries that they have expertise in. In this section, we verify that our results are not driven by investor preferences for local or expertise stocks. Additionally, we consider whether the impact of peers is di¤erent for local and expertise stocks.
We classify all stocks as being local to the individual if the distance from place of residence of the individual to the stock headquarters is less than 100 km. We draw on Døskeland and Hvide (2011) in de…ning expertise stocks. For each individual employed in the private sector, our dataset contains an employer two-digit NACE code at year-end.
For each stock on the OSE, we have the primary NACE codes at year-end from 1996 to 2005. We de…ne an expertise stock as a stock where the worker two-digit NACE code matches the NACE code of the stock. 19 Examining the months that investors move shows that investors predominantly leave one job in December and join a new one in January. The results in Table 3 includes investors that leave in December and join in January while the results used to produce Figure 1 excludes these movers. Taken together these result indicate that our results are robust to the fact that investors pre-dominantly move at the turn of the year.
In order to examine local and expertise purchases we create four dummy variables, buy local , buy non local ; buy expertise and buy non expertise that take the value 1 if the stock being purchased is local, non-local, expertise or non-expertise respectively. We estimate (1) using our dummy variables as dependent variables. Speci…cation (1) of Table 4 considers only local buys (i.e., uses buy local as the dependent variable), while speci…cation (2) considers non-local buys. Speci…cations (3) and (4) consider expertise and non-expertise buys respectively. We include the same socio-demographic variables as in Table 2 , month, plant and postcode …xed e¤ects. We also include zip code plant interaction …xed e¤ects.
In all four speci…cations, all three peer groups are statistically signi…cantly related to the decision to make a stock purchase at the 1% level. It is noteworthy that the impact of co-workers is greater for expertise stocks than for non-expertise stocks. A one standard deviation increase in the fraction of co-workers that make a purchase results in an increase in the probability that the investor makes an expertise (non-expertise) purchase by 0:47% (0:43%), which represents a 248% (35%) change compared to the unconditional mean.
This suggest that co-workers are particularly important for the decision to purchase of stock from the same industry as the investor works in. 20 
Stock Selection
The decision to purchase a particular stock can be seen as two consecutive decisions; …rst the decision to make a stock purchase and second the decision to purchase a particular stock. In this section we consider the relation between investor stock selection and the stock selection decisions of co-workers, family and neighbors.
To do this, we consider as dependent variable, f i;t;s , which is the fraction of total purchases by investor i in month t invested in stock s. As main independent variables we use the fraction of total purchases invested in stock s in month t by co-workers (F 
where Stock M onth is a stock month …xed e¤ect to control for the economy-wide average fraction invested in stock s in month t. The coe¢ cients 1 , 2 , and 3 tells us what is the relation between purchases of the peer group and purchases of the individual investor when the peer group and the investor make purchases. Since, we are considering purchases by the individual and the peer group we are e¤ectively conditioning on both the investor and the peer group being active. 21 If we did not condition on making purchases our coe¢ cient 1 would combine the e¤ects of being active and stock selection. When estimating (3) we therefore require that both the investor makes a purchase in that month and that his peers make a purchase in the same month. In the year 2000, this leaves us with a sample of 2; 824 individuals. It turns out that the restrictive selection criteria is that at least one member of the family makes a purchase in that month.
22 Footnote 23 describes our results when considering a sample that abstracts from family peers (the sample is increased 14:5 times) to make a purchase.
Our regression results are presented in Table 6 . Speci…cations (1) to (3) considers a single peer group, while speci…cations (4) to (6) considers two peer groups simultaneously. Speci…cation (7) includes all three peer groups. In all speci…cations we include month stock …xed e¤ects to control for time-varying economy wide buying pressure.
It is noticeable that introducing all three peer groups reduces the impact of neighbors by 56:55% (comparing speci…cation (3) to (7)), while the impact of the other two groups are less a¤ected by the introduction of the other two groups. Considering speci…cation (7) we can benchmark the relative impact of the three di¤erent peer groups on 21 We consider buys rather than trade in a particular stock since very few individual investors go short in a stock and therefore the selling decision is limited to a very small subset of stocks that is already owned by the investor. 22 The requirement that all peer groups have undertaken a trade implies that these individuals in general belong to larger peer groups than the individuals in the trade analysis, but we have compared the socio demographic variables of the two groups of individuals and in general they are similar. stock selection. A one standard deviation increase in co-worker purchases of a particular stock increases the investor purchases by 0:96% (or 198% relative to the unconditional mean). The corresponding numbers for family peers are astounding, a one standard deviation increase in family purchases of a stock increases investor purchases by 1:97% or 404:41% relative to the unconditional mean. A one standard deviation increase in neighbor purchases of a stock results in the investor increases the fraction invested in the stock by 0:33% or 69:55% relative to the unconditional mean. Additionally, when considering speci…cation (7) the Adjusted R 2 is 0:263 indicating that peer e¤ects and stock month …xed e¤ects explain a signi…cant proportion of the stock selection decision. However, the di¤erence in explanatory power between speci…cation (4) and speci…cation (7) is negligible (0:002) indicating that adding neighbors to co-workers and family negligibly increases the explanatory power. Therefore, it may be the case that peer e¤ects documented in the existing literature using zip code are predominantly driven by social interaction with family and co-workers.
A potential explanation of our results is that workers at a particular plant have a preference for a particular stock for reasons other than social interaction. For example, this could be due to the plant using products or services of that particular company. In speci…cation (8) we introduce plant stock; zip stock and plant zip stock dummies to control for stock preferences at the plant and the zip level. The introduction of these …xed e¤ects captures a substantial amount of variation, the Adjusted R 2 has increased to 0:695 from 0:263. The point estimate of the co-worker peer e¤ect is reduced to 0:0777, however the point estimate is still signi…cant at the 1% level. Now the economic e¤ect is reduced to 77% relative to the unconditional mean.
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Overall, the …ndings of Table 6 suggest that peer e¤ects are important for stock selection and even though all of the three peer group are important it is evident that co-workers and family reduce the importance of neighbors. Additionally, the astounding economic impact of family suggests that it is important to control for the in ‡uence of family when considering peer e¤ects. 23 We re-estimated speci…cation (5) on an expanded dataset that does not require that a family member has made a purchase (resulting in 92; 440; 849 observations). The co-worker coe¢ cient (F 
Changes in Place of work
In this section we consider the e¤ect of former and new co-workers on the stock selection decision after the investor shifts plant. To examine movers in the trade analysis we required that the investor shifts plant and at least one member of all of his peer groups makes a purchases during the entire sample period. To consider all peer groups in the stock analysis we would require the investor to shift plant and that at least one investor in all of the peer groups trade in that particular month. This would result in a severely limited sample and therefore we exclude family peers from this section.
We consider the same investor moves as we did in the trade analysis. That is, we require (i) that the end and start date are both non-missing, (ii) the investor did not change place of employment in the preceding year or does not change place of employment in the next year, (iii) the investor moves at most 4 times between 1993 and 2005, and …nally (iv) the start date at the new place of work is later than the stop date at the previous plant.
In this analysis our main explanatory variables are the fractions invested in stock s in month t by old (F old s;t ) and new (F new s;t ) co-workers, respectively. We interact these variables with four dummy variables that take the value 1 if the date is before / after the stop / start at the old / new plant and 0 otherwise. For example, the variable F old bef ore s;t is the fraction invested in stock s by old co-workers prior to the investor leaving the plant and after the departure date the variable takes a value of 0. Our basic regression estimates Our results are presented in Table 7 . In speci…cations (1) we examine the impact of old co-workers before and after the change in workplace. The stock selection of former coworkers is positively related to the investor's stock selection before and after the move. In speci…cation (2) we consider the impact of co-workers at the new plant before and after the investor has started to work at the plant. The impact of new co-workers is signi…cantly greater (an F statistic of 40:15) after the investor has started at the plant, suggesting that increased interaction between individuals leads to similar stock selection decisions.
In speci…cation (3) we combine the e¤ects past and new co-workers. The e¤ect of current co-workers (at the old or the new plant) is roughly twice that of the e¤ect of past and future co-workers (F tests of the di¤erence in the coe¢ cients are highly signi…cant).
Similar to the trade section, we examine the evolution of the relation between coworker stock selection and investor stocks selection. We estimate the following regression 
where j is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if it is j months until the investor leaves the plant and otherwise 0. Therefore interacting F plant old t;s with j implies that we can evaluate the impact of old (new) co-workers from 12 months before the move to 12 months after the move. We run one separate regression for the old plant and the new plant. Additionally, we include stock-time …xed e¤ects and time dummies.
In Figure 2 we have plotted the interacted peer coe¢ cient against the number of months before the move. The e¤ect of old co-workers falls gradually following the departure from the old plant and the e¤ect of new co-workers increases rapidly following the individual's start at the new plant.
Local and Expertise Trades
In this section we consider how stock selection by our peer groups relates to stock selection of the investor when the stock is either local to the investor or in expertise area of the investor. To do this we use the classi…cation of local and expertise stocks introduced in section 3:2. Panel B of Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the fractions invested in local and expertise stocks by the individuals in our sample. We …nd evidence of local and expertise bias. The mean fraction of purchases invested in expertise stocks 1:30% compared to 0:46% for non-expertise stocks. Similarly, the mean fraction invested in local stocks is 0:68% while the mean fraction invested in non-local stocks is 0:39%.
In Table 8 we estimate (3) for local, non-local, expertise and non-expertise stocks in speci…cations (1) to (4). We include month stock, plant stock, zip code stock and zip code plant stock …xed e¤ects in all speci…cations. It is reassuring to see that the impact of peer e¤ects on stock selection is always statistically signi…cant at the 1% level.
The economic impact of co-workers is signi…cant in all speci…cations, a one standard deviation increase in co-worker purchases results in an increase in the individual's allocation to stock s by at least 58:57% relative to the unconditional mean. It is noteworthy that the …t of speci…cation (3) (expertise stocks) is signi…cantly larger than the other speci…cations suggesting that peer e¤ects are particularly important for explaining the selection of stock in industries that the investor has expertise in. Overall our results suggest that it is not local bias or expertise bias that is driving our results.
Should you listen to your co-workers?
In this section we investigate whether peer purchases are associated with abnormal performance. We use the adapted calendar time methodology introduced by Hoechle, Schmid and Zimmerman (2009) and buy zip t 1 are the fraction of co-workers, family and neighbors that make a purchase in the formation month. Our vector of control variables includes the risk factors M RKT , HM L, SM B and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor (all of them calculated for Norway). 25 Our regression results are presented in Table 9 . In all of our speci…cations, purchases by co-workers are not associated with abnormal investor performance. However, there seems to a negative relation between neighbor purchases and the performance of the 24 We have also considered formation periods of 1 and 12 months, the results are qualitatively very similar. 25 We are grateful to Bernt Arne Ødegaard for providing the factors. The factor data is described in Ødegaard (2009). 20 individual. This suggests that investing when local sentiment is positive is detrimental to performance. Speci…cations, (2), (3) and (4) verify that there is no signi…cant abnormal performance for local or expertise purchases.
We have veri…ed (in unreported analysis) that the lack of abnormal performance associated with peer purchases is not due to the inclusion of risk factors, sentiment purchases or the one month formation period. 
Conclusion
Portfolio theory predicts that investors should invest in risky assets according to the weight that these assets represent in the market portfolio. Although portfolio theory is of considerable normative value, the literature has documented an abundant number of empirical deviations. 27 Motivated by the social psychology literature -which emphasizes the strength of face-to-face communication between individuals that frequently interact in a¤ecting behavior, we ask whether co-workers can explain some of the unexplained portion of stock market behavior by individuals. To examine this question, we use an exceptionally detailed data set from Norway that combines matched employer-employee panel data with common stock transaction data over a 10-year period. Our results suggest large e¤ects of co-workers both on the decision to purchase a stock and the decision which stock to purchase. The results are robust to accounting for unobserved plant, geographical, stock and time heterogeneity at the plant, geographical, and stock level. They are also robust to including measures of peer e¤ects at the geographical and family level. In sum, our results provide strong evidence that individuals'stock purchase decisions are related to those made by their co-workers due to social interaction.
A methodological innovation of the paper is to examine three types of peer e¤ects simultaneously: in the workplace, in the family, and in the neighborhood. This allows us to control for family and neighborhood peer e¤ects in our analysis of workplace peer e¤ects.
It also allows us to compare the magnitude of the di¤erent types of peer e¤ects and perform a "horse race" between them. We …nd that neighborhood e¤ects can be important, consistent with Ivkovic and Weissbenner (2007) , but obtain more unequivocal a¢ rmative results for the e¤ects of social interaction in the workplace and, less surprisingly, in the family.
Our results contribute to an ongoing debate on the role of social interaction in the stock market. While the literature on institutional investors …nds strong evidence of social interaction and network e¤ects among institutional investors, the evidence on social interaction among individual investors has been more mixed. We consider a novel channel for peer e¤ects; the workplace, and contribute to the literature by showing that co-worker investment decisions can explain a substantial amount of heterogeneity in individual asset allocation decisions. As discussed in Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2002) , it is often important for policy purposes to separate individual and social multiplier e¤ects, the reason being that the aggregate impact of intervention may be larger than the sum of its e¤ects on each individual's decision. Consistent with the …ndings of Du ‡o and Saez (2003) in the context of retirement plans, our results suggest that the social multiplier in the workplace is large both in absolute and relative terms when it comes to stock market behavior.
Our …ndings suggests the possibility that puzzling voluntary investments in company stock (e.g., Benartzi, 2001 ) may be partially driven by peer e¤ects at the …rm level:
one obvious object of workplace conversations is the stock market performance of the employer's stock. An interesting question for future work is whether investments in owncompany stock relates to proxies for social interaction among employees, such as the amount of time employees spend together outside work, or the extent to which leisure time interests such as reading novels or going to the gym are shared. Kedia and Rajgopal (2012) …nd evidence consistent with social interaction between …rms in the adoption of stock option grants. Another extension of the current work would be to investigate whether social interaction e¤ects between plants also exist for the decision to purchase stocks and the decision which stock to purchase. 28 For example, it would be interesting to see whether trading behavior is correlated between plants in the same industry and region. This research might be one step in the direction of better understanding contagion e¤ects in stock markets. buy plant The fraction of co-workers that make a purchase.
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buy family The fraction of family members that make a purchase.
buy zip The fraction of neighbors living in the same zip code that makes a purchase.
Stock Selection Variables (monthly) f The fraction of total investor purchases invested in stock s.
F plant
The fraction of total co-worker purchases invested in stock s.
F family
The fraction of total family purchases invested in stock s.
F zip
The fraction of total neighbor purchases invested in stock s.
Individual-Stock Variables (yearly)
Local stock A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the headquarters of the stock is located within 100km of the place of residence of the investor, otherwise 0. Expertise stock A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the investor's two digit NACE code of employment matches the two digit NACE code of the stock, otherwise 0.
Socio-demographic Control Variables (yearly) Income
The yearly income as reported in the individual's tax return. Reported in Norwegian Kroner.
Wealth
The total wealth reported in the individual's tax return for the year. Reported in Norwegian Kroner. Age Investor age at the end of the year.
Male A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual is male and 0 otherwise. Education
The number of completed years of schooling. This table presents descriptive statistics on the industries that our investors work in (column 2) and the industries that are represented on the Oslo Stock Exchange (column 3). Additionally, we decompose the co-worker peer effect depending on the industry of employment of the investor. Financial firms, NACE codes 65, 66 and 67 have been excluded from the sample. For this table, we only consider industries that represent at least 0.5% of investor observations (i.e., the industry has at least roughly 1,600 investors). This restriction implies a loss of less than 6% of the complete sample. To decompose the co-worker peer effect across industries we estimate the following regression
where I j is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the investor works in industry j and 0 otherwise. Column 4 reports our point estimates of the peer effect for our 36 industries. The vector of control variables includes the socio demographic control variables listed in the caption to Table 2 . In addition to time (month), plant and zip fixed effects; we include zip plant interaction fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. T-values are reported in column 5. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. We use a 20% sample of all investor months for which peer groups are defined and socio demographic variables are non-missing.
Industry (NACE code)
Investors OSE Firms Coefficient t-stat Oil and gas extraction. Oil and gas services (11) 10,327 19 0.257*** (5.85) Food products and beverages (15) 7,874 4 0.187*** (6.61) Wood and wood products (20) 2,507 2 0.035 (1.13) Publishing, printing, reproduction (22) 4,601 5 0.117*** (4.56) Chemicals and chemical products (24) 3,123 2 0.984*** (36.27) Rubber and plastic products (25) 1,214 0 0.139*** (2.71) Other non-metallic mineral products (26) Table 3 ). buy expertise , buy non-expertise , buy local and buy non-local takes the value 1 if the individual purchases an expertise, non-expertise, local and nonlocal stock in month t, respectively. A local stock is headquartered closer than 100 km to the residence of the individual. An expertise stock is a stock that has the same two digit NACE code as the firm that employs the individual. We use a 20% sample of all investor months for which peer groups are defined and socio demographic variables are non-missing. , LogWealth 3 , LogIncome×LogWealth, Male and Education. In addition to time (month), two digit NACE code (of investor plant), plant and zip code fixed effects, we include zip-plant interaction fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (t-values are reported in parentheses). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. We use a 20% sample of all investor months for which peer groups are defined and socio demographic variables are non-missing. Variables are described in Appendix.
(1) N 4,580,530 4,580,530 4,580,530 4,580,530 4,580,530 4,580,530 4,580,530 We examine the relative impact of new and former co-workers before and after the investor leaves (joins) the old (new) plant. To do so, we create two dummy variables that take the value of 1 for months before (after) the investor leaves the old plant and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we create two dummy variables that take the value of 1 for months before (after) the investor joins the new plant and 0 otherwise. We interact these four dummy variables with to generate the independent variables , , and . We estimate the OLS regression:
where includes the socio demographic variables listed in the caption to Table 2 . In addition to month, plant and zip code fixed effects; we include zip×plant fixed effects. We also include dummies for the number of months before leaving from old job (time prior leaving), and dummies for the number of months prior to joining new job (time prior joining). There is one dummy variable for each month starting from 12 months before the investor leaves (joins) the old (new) plant to 12 months after (month 0 is omitted). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (t-values in parentheses). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. We investigate the relation between the fraction of peers making a purchase and investor purchases. We estimate the same regression as in Table 2 , but consider different dependent variables. In (1), the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the investor buys a local stock (stocks headquartered closer than 100 km to the individual). In (2), the dependent dummy variable takes the value 1 if the investor purchases a stock that is not local. In (3), the dependent dummy variable takes the value 1 if the investor purchases a stock that he has expertise in (defined as in Døskeland and Hvide, 2011) , while in (4) the dummy variable takes the value 1 if the individual purchases a stock that he does not have expertise in. The socio demographic variables that we control for are listed in the caption to Table 2 . In addition to month, plant and zip fixed effects, we include zip×plant fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (t-values in parentheses). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. We use a 20% sample of all individual months for which peer groups are defined and socio demographic variables are non-missing. Variables are described in Appendix.
(1) We present the results of pooled panel regressions relating the fraction of purchases invested in a particular stock by the investor to the fractions invested in that stock by the investor's peers. The dependent variable f is the fraction of total purchases invested in stock s in month t by the investor. F plant , F family and F zip is the average fraction invested in stock s in month t by plant, family and zip code peers respectively. We include month×stock fixed effects in all specifications. In specification (8) we also include, plant×stock, zip×stock, and zip×plant×stock fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (t-values in parentheses). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are described in Appendix.
(1) N 6,522,816 6,522,816 6,522,816 6,522,816 6,522,816 6,522,816 6,522,816 6,344 We examine the relative impact of new and former co-workers before and after the investor leaves (joins) the old (new) plant (as in Table 3 ). To do so, we create two dummy variables that take the value of 1 for months before (after) the investor leaves the old plant and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we create two dummy variables that take the value of 1 for months before (after) the investor joins the new plant and 0 otherwise. We interact these four dummy variables with the variable , to generate the independent variables , , , where , , is the fraction of month t purchases invested in stock s by investor i. F zip is the average fraction invested in stock s in month t by zip code peers. We include month×stock fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (t-values in parentheses). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are described in Appendix.
( 1 ) We investigate the relation between the stock selection of peers and the stock selection of investors in local and expertise stocks. The dependent variable , , is the fraction of total purchases invested in stock s in month t by investor i. F plant , F family and F zip is the average fraction invested in stock s in month t by plant, family and zip code peers respectively. In specification (1), we only consider stocks that are local to the investor (stocks headquartered closer than 100 km to the investor); thus our dependent variable , , measures the fraction of local purchases invested by the individual in stocks s. In specification (2), we only consider non-local stocks. Specification (3) considers only expertise stocks (defined as in Døskeland and Hvide, 2011) , while specification (4) considers non-expertise stocks. We include month×stock, plant×stock, zip×stock, and zip×plant×stock fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (t-values in parentheses). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are described in Appendix.
(1) We present regression results relating peer buying pressure to returns. We use calendar time portfolio methodology by applying the Hoechle, Schmid and Zimmerman (2009) implementation which allows for the introduction of continuous investor characteristics. Our dependent variable is the monthly excess return of stock s over the three month Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate (NIBOR). Our main independent variables are , , , the fraction of co-workers, family members and neighbors that make a purchase in month t-1, respectively. All specifications include the factors MRKT, HML, SMB and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor (all of them calculated for Norway). Local stock and Expertise stock are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the stock is local (headquarters within 100 km) to the investor or a stock that the investor has expertise (same two digit NACE code) in, respectively. T-values are based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in the Appendix.
(1) 
